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Politechnika Gdan´ska, 80-952 Gdan´sk, Poland
It is known that statistical predictions of quantum theory do not depend on its interpretation.
In particular, an experiment cannot distinguish between the Copenhagen interpretation (involving
no hidden variables) and the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation based on nonlocal hidden variables.
Quantum cryptographic protocols, such as BB84 or E91, are secure and mutually equivalent as long
as one works within the framework of Copenhagen interpretation. But they are inequivalent and
insecure if one considers attacks allowed by the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation. The fundametal
problem of quantum cryptography is therefore this: Are all the statements about security of quantum
protocols based on our belief in one of the two allowed interpretations of quantum mechanics? We
show that this is not the case. Ekert-type protocols can be modified in a way that makes them secure
even if the de Broglie-Bohm nonlocal hidden variables exist. Bennett-Brassard-type cryptography
does not seem to allow for such a correction.
PACS numbers: ?????
I. INTRODUCTION
Our confidence in classical public key cryptosystems such as RSA is based on a belief that there is no efficient
algorithm that allows one to find the private key given only the public one. Since there is no proof that such a
classical algorithm does not exist, and we know that quantum Shor’s algorithm [1] is capable of doing just that, we
cannot consider RSA fundamentally secure. Hence the need for quantum cryptosystems which should, in principle, be
safe against any attack. Protocols such as BB84 and E91 are believed to fulfill the criterion. The first of them takes
its strength from the von Neumann postulate, since gaining any knowledge about a system being sent would result in
wavefunction collapse and loss of information carried by the system [2], and this is detectable. Ekert’s protocol bases
on nonlocal correlations within the system [3]. Here any attempt to extract information changes the initial entangled
state decreasing the Bell expectation value. Both protocols assume that the Copenhagen interpretation is true. Such
an assumption is not fully justified since there are other interpretations of quantum mechanics that produce identical
observable results.
In the de Broglie-Bohm approach (which so far predicts outcomes undistinguishable form those given by the
Copenhagen interpretation [4]) there is no need to invoke the wavefunction collapse hypothesis. A hidden-variable
description of Stern-Gerlach measurements for both a single spin and a pair of spins in a singlet state is given in
detail in the monograph [7]. The results of measurements can be deduced from the position of the particle trajectory
(a hidden variable). An eavesdropper knows for sure and in advance the results of spin measurements. Accordingly,
the usual protocols are insecure. Apparently, the situation is not dramatically better than in the case of classical
cryptography; the fact that we may not believe in nonlocal hidden variables is not yet a guarantee of fundamental
security of our quantum cryptosystems.
In the present paper we show that this is not the end of the story. We prove that even in an interpretation that
includes nonlocal hidden variables it is possible to create a secure quantum key distribution protocol. The crucial idea
is to take advantage of the possibility of flipping-over the spin of particle in the lab of Alice, say, by a measurement
performed by Bob in his lab. The effect is nonlocal, preserves one-to-one correlations typical of the singlet state, and
is possible if and only if the two particles are in an entangled state. In such a protocol the knowledge of particle
positions in transit between the source and the labs of Alice and Bob is not sufficient for determining the key. The
key is literally created at the very last moment when the particles are already in the labs of Alice and Bob. The
security is here a consequence of nonlocality.
The fact that such a possibility may exist followed from the earlier study of nonlocal hidden-variables models of
spin-1/2 and the singlet state [8]. Still, the toy models of EPR correlations were not reliable enough. We needed a
hidden-variable model that is a candidate for a theory equivalent to standard quantum mechanics. This is why in the
present paper we have concentrated on the de Broglie-Bohm model. The analysis follows, with slight modifications,
the one given in [7].
2II. DOUBLE STERN-GERLACH EXPERIMENT
We consider an experiment where a pair of particles in the singlet state is sent along the y axis to Alice and Bob.
Each of the particles enters then the Stern-Gerlach apparatus. The magnetic fields in both devices are aligned in the
same direction, and each particle spends in the field the same time T . Both particles have mass m and magnetic
moment µ. We make the following standard assumptions:
• We suppose that the magnetic fields are large enough to neglect the kinetic part of the Hamiltonian during the
time of interaction of a particle with the fields.
• We also suppose that the time T is short enough not to change particles position in the y-direction. During the
interaction with the field the particle is only given velocity in z-direction.
• We will consider fields of the form: B(x, y, z) = B(z) = B0 +Bz. Such fields are clearly non-physical, but their
use is justified by Bo¨hm in [10].
• We assume that particles’ motion along the y axis is constant throughout the experiment.
Both assumptions and calculations below are based on those given by Holland in [7].
We take the fields in Alice’s device to be B1(z) and in Bob’s B2(z), and given explicitly by
B1(z) = B0 +Bz (1)
B2(z) = sK(B0 + Bz) (2)
where we assume B > 0, K > 1 and s = ±1 is a number randomly chosen by Bob.
The initial wavefunction at the entrance is in the singlet state
ψ0(z1, z2) = f1(z1)f2(z2)
1√
2
(u+v− − u−v+) (3)
where u± and v± are eigenvectors of the spin operators in the z-direction corresponding to the eigenvalues ±1, and
we choose f1(z1) and f2(z2) to be Gaussian.
We now use our assumption that the fields are strong enough to surpass the kinetic part of the Hamiltonian and
write the Pauli equation in the form
i~
∂ψ
∂t
= [µB1(z1)σz ⊗ I + µB2(z2)I ⊗ σz]ψ (4)
Solving it and taking (3) as an initial condition we have
ψ(z1, z2, t) =
1√
2
f1(z1)f2(z2)
[
e−i
µ
~
(B0(1−sK)+Bz1−sKBz2)tu+v− − e−i
µ
~
(B0(−1+sK)−Bz1−sKBz2)tu−v+
]
(5)
It is convenient to Fourier analyze functions f1(z1) and f2(z2)
f1(z1) =
1√
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
dk1g1(k1)e
ik1z1 (6)
f2(z2) =
1√
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
dk2g2(k2)e
ik2z2 (7)
(5) becomes then
ψ(z1, z2, t) =
1
2
√
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
dk1
∫ +∞
−∞
dk2g2(k2)e
ik2z2g1(k1)e
ik1z1
×
(
e−i
µ
~
(B0(1−sK)+Bz1−sKBz2)tu+v− − e−i
µ
~
(B0(−1+sK)−Bz1−sKBz2)tu−v+
)
(8)
After leaving the field the system evolves according to the free Schro¨dinger equation:
i~
∂Ψ
∂t
= − ~
2
2m
(
∂2
∂z21
+
∂2
∂z22
)
Ψ (9)
3Its general solution is of the form
Ψ(z1, z2, t) =
∑
a,b=±
∫ +∞
−∞
dk1
∫ +∞
−∞
dk2Ψ
ab
k1,k2
(z1, z2)e
− i
~
Eabk1,k2
tuavb (10)
where (
∂2
∂z21
+
∂2
∂z22
)
Ψabk1,k2(z1, z2) +
2mEabk1,k2
~2
Ψabk1,k2(z1, z2) = 0 (11)
Now (10) becomes the initial condition leading to
ψ(z1, z2, T ) = Ψ(z1, z2, 0) (12)
Comparing we get
Ψ++k1,k2(z1, z2) = Ψ
−−
k1,k2
(z1, z2) = 0 (13)
Ψ+−k1,k2(z1, z2) =
1
2
√
2pi
g2(k2)e
ik2z2g1(k1)e
ik1z1e−i
µT
~
(B0(1−sK)+Bz1−sKBz2) (14)
Ψ−+k1,k2(z1, z2) = −
1
2
√
2pi
g2(k2)e
ik2z2g1(k1)e
ik1z1e−i
µT
~
(B0(−1+sK)−Bz1−sKBz2) (15)
Using (11) we calculate:
E+−k1,k2 =
~
2
2m
[(
k1 − BµT
~
)2
+
(
k2 + sK
BµT
~
)2]
(16)
E−+k1,k2 =
~
2
2m
[(
k1 +
BµT
~
)2
+
(
k2 − sKBµT
~
)2]
(17)
Substituting explicit expressions for g1 and g2
g1(k1) =
(
2σ20
pi
) 1
4
e−k
2
1σ
2
0 g2(k2) =
(
2σ20
pi
) 1
4
e−k
2
2σ
2
0 (18)
(13)–(15) and (16)–(17) to (10) we have
Ψ(z1, z2, t) =
σ0
2pi
√
pi
e−i
µT
~
(B0(1−sK)+Bz1−sKBz2)
×
∫ +∞
−∞
dk1e
−k21σ
2
0eik1z1e−i
~
2m (k1−
BµT
~ )
2
t
∫ +∞
−∞
dk2e
−k22σ
2
0 eik2z2e−i
~
2m (k2+sK
BµT
~ )
2
tu+v−
− σ0
2pi
√
pi
e−i
µT
~
(B0(−1+sK)−Bz1+sKBz2)
×
∫ +∞
−∞
dk1e
−k21σ
2
0eik1z1e−i
~
2m (k1+
BµT
~ )
2
t
∫ +∞
−∞
dk2e
−k22σ
2
0eik2z2e−i
~
2m (k2−sK
BµT
~ )
2
tu−v+ (19)
Integrating and rearranging we get
Ψ(z1, z2, t) =
1
2σ0
√
piε
e
−i tan−1
(
~t
2σ20m
)
e
i
(
−
(1+s2K2)B2µ2T2t
2~mε +
~t
8mσ40ε
(z21+z
2
2)
)
e
− 1
4σ20ε
(z21+z
2
2)−
(1+s2K2)B2µ2T2t2
4m2σ20ε ×
×
(
e−i
µT
~
(B0(1−sK)+Bz1−sKBz2)e
−
(z1−sKz2)BµTt
2mσ2
0
ε e
i
~(z1−sKz2)BµTt
2
4m2σ4
0
ε u+v−+
−e−iµT~ (B0(−1+sK)−Bz1+sKBz2)e
(z1−sKz2)BµTt
2mσ20ε e
−i
~(z1−sKz2)BµTt
2
4m2σ40ε u−v+
)
(20)
4where ε = 1 + ~
2t2
4σ40m
2 . From the conservation law
∂ρ
∂t
+
∂j1
∂z1
+
∂j2
∂z2
= 0 (21)
we get currents defined by
ja =
~
2mi
[
Ψ†
∂
∂za
Ψ−
(
∂
∂za
Ψ†
)
Ψ
]
, a = 1, 2 (22)
Its easy to find that
ρ =
1
2σ20piε
e
− 1
2σ20ε
(z21+z
2
2)−
(1+s2K2)B2µ2T2t2
2m2σ20ε cosh
(
(z1 − sKz2)BµT t
mσ20ε
)
(23)
j1 =
1
2σ20piε
e
− 1
2σ20ε
(z21+z
2
2)−
(1+s2K2)B2µ2T2t2
2m2σ20ε
~
m
[
BµT
~ε
sinh
(
(z1 − sKz2)BµT t
mσ20ε
)
+
~tz1
4mσ40ε
cosh
(
(z1 − sKz2)BµT t
mσ20ε
)]
(24)
j2 =
1
2σ20piε
e
− 1
2σ20ε
(z21+z
2
2)−
(1+s2K2)B2µ2T2t2
2m2σ20ε
~
m
[
−sKBµT
~ε
sinh
(
(z1 − sKz2)BµT t
mσ20ε
)
+
~tz2
4mσ40ε
cosh
(
(z1 − sKz2)BµT t
mσ20ε
)]
(25)
Introducing velocity as a hydrodynamical variable from the formula ja = ρva we derive velocities (in z-direction) of
each particle
v1 =
~
2tz1
4m2σ40ε
+
BµT
mε
tanh
(
(z1 − sKz2)BµT t
mσ20ε
)
(26)
v2 =
~
2tz2
4m2σ40ε
− sKBµT
mε
tanh
(
(z1 − sKz2)BµT t
mσ20ε
)
(27)
In the causal interpretation the particles center of mass has a well-defined translational motion implied by its initial
position and velocity. In the case of homogeneous fields only first parts of velocities survive and particles trajectory
is hyperbola which results from the natural spreading of the wave packet. For large B and small t the second part
dominates and can move the particle to either positive or negative side of the xy plane. When t→∞ the second part
approaches 0 and the motion is governed by the first part, but since the sign of velocity is then the same as the sign
of the z component the direction of translational motion will not change.
Now we will show how this result can be used to send information.
III. THE PROTOCOL
1. Alice, Bob or a third party (it is not significant to the protocol) generates N pairs in the singlet state (3).
2. Bob generates two random numbers s = ±1 and δ = {0, pi2}. And aligns his device at an angle δ to Alice’s.
3. Let the size of the entrance slit of each of the devices be d. Then, basing on the points on the screen where
his particles have landed, Bob can calculate whether the position of his particle at the entrance was too close to the
center of the device; the criterion is the inequality
|z20| < d
2K
(28)
If the particle was too close Bob proclaims this result and this instance is disregarded.
4. As we have shown above the outcome of the experiment (which side of the xy plane each particle gets to) depends
only on the second part of the velocity equation (assuming B is large enough) and, of course, initial position. Thus
we neglect first parts in (26) and (27):
v1 =
BµT
mε
tanh
(
(z1 − sKz2)BµT t
mσ20ε
)
(29)
v2 = −sKBµT
mε
tanh
(
(z1 − sKz2)BµT t
mσ20ε
)
(30)
5It is easy to notice that
WA = sgn(v1) = −sgn(z20)s (31)
WB = sgn(v2) = sgn(z20) (32)
We will consider WA and WB to be outcomes of experiments form Alice’s and Bob’s points of view. Figures 1 and 2
show the trajectories of pairs of the particles for different values of s (computed numerically). Initial positions have
been taken the same in both figures.
5. Bob proclaims δ for every instance of experiment.
6. Bob randomly chooses half of the instances of the experiment, and proclaims WB and s (δ is already publicly
known). Alice proclaims WA corresponding to each of proclaimed WB . If in any case for δ = 0 WB 6= −WAs then the
procedure is aborted. If not, for both values of s separately, the Bell’s expectation value is checked and if it differs
from 2
√
2 too much the procedure is also aborted.
7. We take values WA, for δ = 0, to be the bits of the key. Alice knows it since its implied by the side of the screen
her particle landed on. Bob knows s so he too can find the bit of the key, as WB = −WAs. Since s is a random
number chosen by Bob, not correlated in any way with the state of the system before the particles entered Alice’s
and Bob’s labs, no knowledge about system prior to experiment can lead to the discovery of the key.
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FIG. 1: Trajectories of particles for s = +1. We see that the particles move in the opposite directions along z axis.
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FIG. 2: Trajectories of particles for s = −1. Here Bob’s and Alice’s particles move in the same direction along z axis.
Comparing it with Fig. 1 we see that changing the value of s has no effect on the outcome of the experiment at Bob’s (though
the trajectory of his particle is slightly affected) and it flips the outcome of the experiment at Alice’s.
